This paper evaluates immigration's impact on African American wages, unemployment, employment and incarceration rates using a relatively large cross-sectional dataset of 900 cities. An endemic problem potentially plaguing the cross-sectional metro approach to immigration has been endogeneity. Does increased immigration to a city lead to improved economic outcomes, or does a city's improving labor market attract immigrant inflows? The paper focuses on resolving endogeneity concerns through a variety of controls, statistical methods and tests. Overall, results strongly support one-way causation from increased immigration including Latinos to higher African American wages, lower unemployment, and increased job creation. Rising immigration including from Latin America is not responsible for higher Black incarceration rates.
Introduction
The relationship between immigration and the African-American labor market has received limited attention in the economic literature in recent years. A recent NBER survey on immigration for instance with more than 200 references by Kerr and Kerr (2011) does not once mention immigration's effect on African Americans; David Card's (2007) comprehensive summary of the consequences of immigration on major U.S. cities also does not examine its impact on African Americans.
1 One notable exception is the work of Borjas, Grogger and Hansen (BGH, 2010) that finds "a strong correlation between immigration, black wages, black unemployment rates, and black incarceration rates." BGH argue that the rapid rise in Black incarceration rates from 1960 to 2000 was due to falling Black real wages, which in turn is attributable to immigration.
They state "Remarkably, as far as we know, no study has examined if there is a link between the resurgence of large-scale immigration and the employment and incarceration trends in the Black population." This study then is the second to study the link between immigration and wages, unemployment, employment, and incarceration rates for African Americans, and the first to examine causality between immigration and African American economic outcomes.
This paper uses new Census data, with considerably more city level observations than prior works, and overturns the results of BGH. It is the first economic work in more than two decades to study the impact of Latino immigration on African Americans, and the first to evaluate the relationship between increases in Latinos and Black incarceration rates. The examination of the economic consequences of immigration, particularly from Latin America, explicitly on African Americans is motivated by the often popular perception that both ethnic groups tend to have large numbers of low skilled workers, possess similar education and demographic profiles, live predominantly in urban areas and sometimes compete directly for the same jobs. There is further a prevailing view that immigrants including Latinos are willing to work for less, and have taken jobs away from Blacks. As a result, widely reported tensions between Blacks and Latinos have emerged, and been extensively covered by policy institutes, political science and sociology journals as well as the popular press. Although these strains are widely perceived as economic in nature, they have paradoxically received no recent attention in the economic literature.
Research by Morris and Gimpel (2007) finds "Conflict between African Americans and Latina/os for group position, status, and political power is increasing as most immigrants of Hispanic ancestry settle in areas proximate to African American populations in the nation's largest cities....Recent studies have begun to document, in rising levels of detail, the tension that has emerged between immigrant groups and lower-skilled American natives, a high proportion of whom are African American (McClain et al., 2006; Kim 2000; Vaca, 2004; Hirschman, et al. 1999) ." They attribute these tensions to "economic competition among ethnic groups (see also , Bonacich 1972; 1976; Cummings 1977; 1980; Cummings and Lambert 1997; Forbes 1997; Olzak 1992) ." Gay (2006) further focuses on Black and Latino economic rivalry: "the trend is disturbing: anti-Latino sentiment among the black mass public may undermine elite efforts to build black-Latino alliances, putting at risk the groups future political and economic status...most accounts of the conflict identify the competition over scarce resources as a central force in Black-immigrant relations. (Alozie and Ramirez, 1999; Falcon, 1988; Johnson and Oliver, 1989; Kaufmann, 2003; McClain, 1993; McClain and Karnig, 1990; McClain and Tauber, 1998; Mindiola et al., 2002; Mohl, 2003; Vaca, 2004) ." Saucedo (2008) and African American rivalry that cite economic competition, these works are not published in economic journals, and only reference immigration as a possible motivating factor in BlackLatino competition; they do not actually estimate the effect of Latino immigration on the African American labor market, including its impact on wages and unemployment.
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A major difficulty endemic in the immigration literature is the issue of endogeneity -cities that are experiencing an economic boom may simultaneously attract immigrants. In this case, increases in immigration will be endogenously related with higher wages and job creation, but not contribute to or cause these improving economic outcomes. To mitigate endogeneity, we use GMM (Generalized Methods of Moments), demographic/educational control variables identified by the literature and control for domestic migration of native-born Americans from other states.
If the simultaneity issue is relevant (and a driving factor generating spurious significance), a significant relationship should occur between domestic migration and improving economic outcomes as well as between native and foreign-born migration patterns since both should respond similarly to economic incentives. As a result, we additionally accommodate for endogeneity by controlling for both out-of-state and in-state native-born migration flows. larger than the domestic migration counterparts, and there is no significant relationship between flows of immigrants and native-born Americans to particular cities. Causality results further highlight significant one-way Granger causality from immigration to higher Black wages and wage growth; higher wages do not contribute to more immigration and immigration inflows.
2 Note Card (1990) more than two decades ago reported that in response to the Mariel boat lift, three days of riots occurred in several Black neighborhoods. He noted that a government sponsored committee identified other long-standing grievances in the Black community as its cause, but cited the labor market competition of Cuban refugees as an important background factor.
3 MSAs are metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas, where the Census follows the OMB definition: "Metropolitan Statistical Areas have at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more population" and "Micropolitan Statistical Areas a new set of statistical areas have at least one urban cluster of at least 10,000 but less than 50,000 population plus adjacent territory that has a high degree of social and economic integration."
Increases in immigration further contribute to lower Black unemployment rates, particularly among young Black men. Cities that experience positive flows of immigrants not only have lower unemployment rates, but also possess significant declines in unemployment. Results further show that immigration Granger Cause to higher Black employment rates and job growth.
Lastly, we investigate BGH's findings that link immigration to Black incarceration rates.
Their paper posits that immigration induced a decline in Black wages, which then encouraged some Black men to exit the labor force and shift to illegal activities. Their work emphasizes the time series correlation between the rapid rise in both immigration and Black incarceration.
BGH stress that Blacks are more susceptible than Whites to immigration, and hence the rise in immigration has contributed to a rise in Black incarceration rates. However, this correlation has clearly broken down. While the share of foreign-born in U.S. MSAs has risen by 57% from 1994 to 2010, the incarceration rates of Blacks and Whites have declined -22% and -11% respectively over this time period. As a result, the Black/White incarceration rates have declined 18%. Our cross-sectional data of 900 MSAs represent the largest study of African American incarceration rates across U.S. cities, and demonstrates that cities with more immigration or immigration flows This is solely an empirical paper for two reasons. First, this work focuses on endogeneity and robustness. It employs a variety of methods to demonstrate that the regressions do not suffer from a endogeneity bias. To highlight that the results are not sensitive to specific specifications, the paper analyzes the data in both levels and changes, uses alternative control variables, different years, various statistical tests and more than a handful of labor market variables (including African American median wages, average wages, per capita wages, male wages, income shares of the poor and rich, as well as for income share of different age groups). It also evaluates immigration's consequences on Black unemployment, employment and incarceration rates. As a result, it is the most comprehensive empirical study of the impact of the foreign-born, especially from Latin America, on the African American labor market.
Second, there are several prominent model-driven papers including BGH. A key problem with immigration modelling is that the assumptions often drive the conclusions. BGH assume that African Americans and immigrants are substitutes, so naturally their model predicts an increase in immigrants will lower the Black wage rate. However, other papers emphasize that immigrants specialize in different and complementary skill sets; hence, they increase both the supply of labor which tends to depress wages for workers with similar skill profiles, and the demand of workers as they consume goods and services, which creates more jobs. Models developed by Peri (2006, 2008) and Peri (2007 Peri ( , 2009 show that the increased supply's effect on lower wages tends to be relatively modest, because immigrants tend to be complementary to native-born workers. Peri and Sparber (2009) Immigration further may contribute to improving economic welfare in a city through boosting entrepreneurial activity or increasing its population size. The Kauffman Center (Fairlie, 2011) finds that immigrants tend to be more entrepreneurial as they start their own businesses at nearly twice the rate of other Americans. Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010) determine that skilled immigrants increase innovation in the U.S. as immigrant's patent at double the native-born rate. Wheeler (2001) provides a model where "urban agglomeration enhances productivity by facilitating the firm-worker matching process." His model assumes workers skills are complementary in production. A similar model can be used to show that immigrants who bring different skill sets complement skills of African Americans, and when immigrants move to a city and its population increases, so do wages in the Black community. Ciccone and Hall (1996) find that agglomeration improves economic activity; Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) offer an extensive literature survey and new empirical evidence that emphasize the critical role agglomeration economies play in a city's economic development. "The largest body of evidence supports the view that cities succeed by spurring the transfer of information". Thus, immigration by increasing specialization, comparative advantage, entrepreneurial activity or population size can improve labor market efficiency and raise wages of African Americans.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the data and econometric methodology, Section 3 discusses the results, and Section 4 concludes.
Data and Methodology

Data
We use Census data from factfinder2.census.gov, and consider a relatively large sample of 910
MSAs from the 2010 Census. Our analysis begins with analyzing median Black family income: The Census uses "Blacks or African Americans" interchangeably; this paper follows this convention. Immigrants and foreign-born are also identical terms, and Americans born in the U.S. are native-born. 4 The census reports the number of foreign-born (F B), and the number born in Latin American (LAT ):
B05002 "PLACE OF BIRTH BY CITIZENSHIP STATUS"
B05006 "PLACE OF BIRTH FOR THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE U.S."
The Census reports regions in B05006 including Latin America. There is a difference between Latino (someone born in Latin America) and Hispanic (Spanish or Portuguese speaking). The foreign-born sum of the 910 MSAs is 38.8 million, and represents more than 97% of Census surveyed immigrants in the U.S.; the immigrant share (percentage of immigrants) is 13.4%. The
Latino foreign-born sum is 20.2 million and its share is 6.8%. Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (BFK, 1997) and Borjas (2003) argue that the metro approach that exploits spatial relationships is flawed for several reasons. Borjas posits "First, immigrants may not be randomly distributed across labor markets. If immigrants endogenously cluster in cities with thriving economies, there would be a spurious positive correlation between immigration and wages. Second, natives may respond to the wage impact of immigration on a local labor market by moving their labor or capital to other cities." He claimed that wage growth then will vary across regions for reasons that are unrelated to immigration, and that exogenous controls are necessary. Both BFK and Borjas maintain that natives may respond to the wage impact 4 We use the American Community Survey 5-Year estimates since they are available for more than 940 metro areas for median wages; further, the 5-year estimates are also available for foreign-born, native migration rates and other background variables for 910 metros. The Census reports that the 5-year estimates are more reliable and cover more areas than the 1-year estimates; e.g., the 1-year estimates for median wages are available for 465 metros and its standard deviation averages more than double the 5-year-estimates for both 1-year median wages and foreign and native-born immigration shares. For completeness, we also report 1-year foreign-born and migration estimates on median wages and show that the coefficients estimates are robust. Variable definitions for the other independent variables are in the appendix.
Accommodating for Endogeneity
of immigration by moving away. As a result, immigration does not have a strong discernible effect due to equilibrating labor market flows. We address these concerns of endogeneity and specification in multiple ways:
(1) We use both OLS and GMM methods and demonstrate that the GMM specifications (see Appendix I) do not suffer from weak instruments. We also accommodate for cross-sectional heteroskedastic errors by reporting White standard errors.
(2) If an economic boom in metro i had attracted immigrants, we would expect the metro to also have attracted native-born workers from other cities; thus, in this case, we would expect a high domestic migration share. If the booming city argument is relevant, we expect the domestic share estimates to be significant and approximately equal to the foreign-born share; further, a high correlation should exist between domestic and foreign-born shares. Alternatively, if immigration was leading to native-born flight, we would expect a negative relationship to occur between the shares. Hence, controlling for domestic share, then should be a good way of controlling for the potential relevance of a booming city or negative net migration. (4) Scatterplots and correlations analyses illustrate that native-born migration from other states are not significantly correlated to foreign-born migration patterns; hence the concern of endogeneity (via the booming city hypothesis) is not supported . Further, there is no evidence that natives in the same state move away or that natives from other states are deterred by immigration inflows. The low correlation between foreign and native-born shares implies that migration flows do not affect the foreign-born share estimates in the regression analysis.
(5) The regressions use relevant control variables from the literature; both the controls and 5 A city's share of its own state residents may change from 2005 to 2010 due to births or deaths, but also due to positive (negative) domestic migration as people move from other parts of the state to the MSA (leave the MSA), possibly driven by economic circumstances.
foreign-born estimates are highly significant and explain an economically substantial amount of the variation in wages. stagnation, which should adversely affects African Americans; e.g., Freeman and Rodgers (2004) find that slow growth adversely hurts African Americans, particularly young Black men. We also use 2010 one-year estimates for immigration, migration and wages; if Borjas's equilibrating labor market arguments are correct, labor market adjustment would not likely be over one-year, but over a decade (the typical dataset used, and the one BGH use).
(9) The 2010 Census consists of a sample size of more than 900 metropolitan and micropolitan cities, and thus not only includes large metropolitan areas similar to most prior metro analysis.
Larger cities tend to be richer, slower growing and may not be geographically representative (more are in the North East) than smaller MSAs. Hence, our analysis specfication is considerably more compreshensive than most prior panel works using large MSA data.
Regression Specification
Nickell and Saleheen (2009) explore immigration's impact on British wages with a theoretical model derived from each region's aggregate production function. Their reliance on regional factors and standard labor market micro-based assumptions indicates this framework provides a good framework to derive an appropriate regression specification. After solving the first order conditions, they demonstrate that the immigrant's wage rate depends on basic factors such as regional productivity, regional labor market slack, regional labor market and unchanging occupation/regional characteristics. The productivity level is proxied by education (including the share that have dropped out, possess a high school degree and have a college degree) as well as experience which is proxied by age (BGH also use age as a proxy for experience). The labor market slack is the lagged unemployment rate, and the occupation characteristics are the share of Blacks engaged in manufacturing as its decline has been cited in other literature including BGH as an important variable in Black wages. Adding additional occupational shares such as construction and Business and Professional Services are not significant. Using Nickell and Saleheen's basic framework, equation (1) tests the effects of an increase in city's i foreign and native-born share on logged Black wages, W i , for city i:
where F BN i is the foreign-born share relative to the native-born share, M IG i is the domestic migration share of the total population from other states (native-born Americans that moved to the MSA from other states), and Z i is a vector of demographic and economic control variables for MSA i. Z i includes the African American College graduation rate (COL i ), the Dropout rate (DROP i ), the High school graduate rate (HS i ), the share employed in manufacturing (M AN i ), the median age (proxy for experience) and the unemployment rate, (U N E i ) in metro i. Alteratively, Altonji and Card (1991) , BGH and others consider the share of immigrants in the total population (F B); we prefer this specification as it allows a more ready comparison to the domestic migration variable (which has total population as its denominator). Note, Nickell and Saleheen's specification does not include M IG i ; however, we include it (to control for the possible endogeneity of booming cities or negative native-born migration) and to compare its coefficient size to the foreign-born effect (as a test of the booming city hypothesis). Since F B is a percentage, and the left hand-side is logged, the coefficient is readily interpretable. If underlying economic conditions are the cause of the correlation between F B and W , β 2 > 0 and F B and M IG should be highly correlated, since native-born Americans (particularly if they have the same age cohort) should respond similarly to economic events.
An additional specification that accommodates further for endogeneity by controlling for native-born Americans flows from other states as well as from the same state is: inflows. For expediency we refer to these two terms as interstate and intrastate migration flows.
If a spurious correlation was driving the result due to a positive unobservable economic shock, we would expect native-born Americans to flow to the MSA from other states (∆MIG) and from within the state (∆SS), β 2 , β 3 > 0. In contrast, if the unobserved shock was due to native-born flight, we would expect β 3 < 0. In either cases, if the shocks were relevant there would be an omitted variables problem the β 1 would be biased and should differ from its estimate in (2).
A second reason that we report both specifications is their different sample sizes; inclusion of 2005 data for migration flows lowers the sample size to approximately 495. While equations (1) and (2) 
where ∆F B is the immigrant flow (change from 2005 to 2010 divided by the population in 2005).
The distinction between the regressions is subtle. Borjas (2003) argues that the static approach in (1) potentially ignores the long-run adjustment of native-born labor flows that equilibrate the market by moving away: "These factor flows would re-equilibrate the market. As a result, a comparison of the economic opportunities facing native workers in different cities would reveal little or no difference because, in the end, immigration affected every city, not just the ones that actually received immigrants". To accommodate for Borjas' concerns, equation (2) adjusts for native-born flows from other states and movement within the state, and (3) evaluates the current impact of rising immigrant inflows (while controlling for equilibrating domestic migration labor flows) on Black wage rates, presumably before or during the long-run labor adjustment.
It further can be used to directly test Borjas' criticism of the metro approach which ignores equilibrating labor flows since our approach tests the importance of both immigrant and nativeborn flows on an MSA; e.g., if β 1 > 0 and β 2 =0 (or β 1 > β 2 ), then the metro approach is valid.)
Additionally, using annual data, we test whether foreign-born inflows affect the growth rate of wages while controlling for native-born flows :
Lastly, Card and DiNardo (200) and Card (2007) presents a specification based on a model where each city produces output using a production function that depends on a CES aggregate.
In this case, logged average wages depend on local skill groups shares and productivity differences across cities. Card (2007) then regresses logged wages on the log of the immigration share in each city (LF B i ) and two control variables: the log of city size, (LT P OP i ), and the fraction of college-educated workers in the city. We also include the Black dropout rate; note, Card does not include the effect of migration.
A Graphical View of the Relationship between Immigration, Domestic Migration and Economic Outcomes
Before presenting the regressions, we examine Borjas, Freeman, and Katz's conjectures concerning the extent of simultaneity and the response of native-born Americans to immigration flows. To gain insight, we present several scatterplots of the relationship between foreign and native-born migration as well as their relationships to Black wages for 910 MSAs. Figure I shows the lack of a strong relationship between immigrant and domestic migration share from other states as the correlation is a relatively modest 7%. Figure II illustrates that this weak link is not due to demographic differences, since the correlation between the foreign-born share of working age (18-64) and domestic migration share that are working age (18-64) is approximately zero. and foreign-born flows of high school dropouts; in both cases, there is no significant correlation.
The lack of a significant relationship between native and foreign-born shares as well as between native and foreign-born migration flows has two implications. First, there is no evidence to support the contention that immigrants are deterring non-natives from moving to the region.
Second, the lack of significant comovements casts doubt (among several pieces of evidence) on the endogeneity bias potentially caused by booming cities simultaneously attracting immigrants.
Since if booming cities attracted immigrants, these cities should be equally attractive to nativeborn Americans. Thus, MSAs that have boomed should have a significant relationship between foreign and domestic migration shares, and cities that are booming should experience significant comovements in both foreign and native-born Americans inflows. One reason immigration and domestic migration flows may differ is that immigrants tend to choose cities based on historical patterns, Card and Dinardo (2000) state "newly arriving immigrants to settle in places where previous immigrants from the same country already live." (See also Bartel, 1989; Bartel and Koch, 1991; Dunlevy, 1991) . Zavodny (1999) 6 This is unlikely due to endogeneity as native-born from other states should also to move to the state, which is clearly not the case. It is hence not easy to explain this correlation and may indicate that it is important to control for this variable; we further investigate the effects below. Borjas' endogeneity contention; while there is a significant relationship between immigrants and residents of the same state (so immigrants are not leading to native-born flight), there is no evidence this is due to the unobserved booming cities argument, as no significant link occurs between same state migration flows and African American wages or wage growth.
Overall, although these are only scatter plots that illustrate correlations, they are for a substantial number of MSAs and convey three key messages: there is little relationship between native and foreign-born migration, domestic migration is not substantially correlated to economic activity, and immigration and African American economic activity are significantly related. More importantly, the regression tables that follow confirm, that even after controlling for demographic MSA characteristics, the link between immigration and high wages is positive and robust; further, the immigration effect on wages (and other labor market measures) is substantially higher than the relationship between domestic migration and these same labor market variables.
GMM assumptions
GMM provides consistent estimates when the instruments are correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables, and orthogonal to the error term. GMM can yield biased inference if there are weak instruments -this occurs when the set of instrumental variables do not adequately explain the endogenous variable. Before GMM tests are presented, we evaluate the validity of the assumptions and test whether the instruments adequately explain foreign-born. Our instruments are the six control variables plus several additional variables related to foreign-born background characteristics and demographics. These are the foreign-born dropout rate, the foreign-born high school graduation rate, the foreign-born college graduate rate and the total amount of schooling; additionally, we use the total population, Black population and total college graduation rate.
A regression of the immigration share on the instruments yields an adjusted R 2 of 61.2% and Table 1 presents the effect of immigration and domestic migration on African American wages.
Regression Results
Wages and Immigration
Results for (1.1) reveal that a 1% increase in F B (the immigration share) is associated with a 1.6% rise in Black median wages with a corresponding t statistic of 7.8 (Prob. Value = .0000).
The coefficient is economically large; e.g., consider the St. Louis MSA with an immigrant share of 4.5%. If St. Louis had an immigration share equal to other top 30 MSAs (13.5%), median wages would be 13% higher. The R 2 statistic equals 22%, and indicates that the regression explains a significant amount of Black wages. The F B estimate is roughly five times larger and significantly different than the M IG estimate; further, since F B and M IG are basically orthogonal, removing M IG changes F B only slightly, from 1.6 to 1.5. The GMM specification (1.2) also highlights that increases in F B have a significant and economically sizeable effect on Black wages as the coefficient is 2.6 with a t statistic nearly 6 (Prob.=0.0000).
Equations (1.3) and (1.4) show a significant positive relationship exists between Black wages and LAT (the share of Latinos in an MSA); the Latino OLS and GMM estimates are 1.4 and 3.1 with t statistics of 5.1 and 4.2, respectively; the R 2 = 20%. Equations (1.5)-(1.8) highlight that increases in F B and LAT also lead to significant increases in African American mean wages; the coefficients estimates are similar and the t stats on average exceed 5. The R 2 = 34% for (1.5) and 32% for (1.7). A similar positive, significant and economically sizeable relationship exists between immigration and per capita Black wages; e.g., (1.9)-(1.12) highlight that the F B (LAT )
estimates are large and the t statistics on average also exceed 5. The R 2 = 37% for (1.9) and 38% These results imply that cities with more immigrants including Latinos have significantly fewer
Blacks with low income. An alternative specification that uses the official poverty definition of the Census also has significant F B estimates of -.43(.09) and -.62(.17) for the OLS and GMM regressions, respectively; the R 2 is 38%, but there are only 280 observations compared to the 908 observations for (3.1). Additionally, if the $15,000 threshold is used, the F B (s.e.) coefficients are -.6 (.12) and -1.0 (.31) for the OLS and GMM specifications, and hence again there is significant evidence that MSAs with more immigrants have fewer poor Blacks. Finally, Card's specification yields highly significant negative coefficients (s.e.) as well since the GMM specification for F B and LAT equals .12 (.017) for -.22 (.019), respectively and further support the premise that immigration is not creating a Black underclass with incentives to commit crimes.
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In sharp contrast, more immigration is associated with more upper-middle class/rich African Americans (incomes exceeding $75,000); the F B and LAT estimates in (3.5)-(3.8) are roughly +.6 with t statistics averaging above 5. Results are also significant for incomes greater than $60,000 with F B and LAT coefficients ranging from .6 to .8 with t statistics again averaging above 5. In all specifications, results indicate that cities with more foreign (or Latin American)
born as a share of population have significantly more African Americans with higher income; the coefficients are economically sizeable and the Prob. values are less than .001. The Card specification also supports the link between immigration and rich African Americans, as the t statistics for F B and LAT are all above 5. Lastly, we examine whether immigration increases the rich to poor gap among African Americans (incomes exceeding $75,000 -incomes < $20,000) in (3.9)-(3.12). The OLS and GMM regression both reveal that the F B coefficient is .8 with a t statistic exceeding 4 (Prob. 0.000) and an R 2 estimate of 24%, which is sizeable for explaining an income share gap between rich and poor. The LAT estimates are also positive and sizeable, indicating that increases in Latinos to a metro are associated with more rich and less poor Blacks; further, F B averages 3 times M IG across (3.1)-(3.12). Equations (3.13)-(3.24) use (2) and confirm that the results are robust to domestic migration flows across states (∆M IG) and within states (∆SS). For conciseness, we report only F B (or LAT ), ∆M IG and ∆SS estimates.
The fact that we are accommodating for migration flows (as well as other relevant variables)
makes it very unlikely that there is a spurious correlation of more immigrants/more rich Blacks and fewer immigrants/less poor Blacks. 11 The GMM first stage yields an R 2 statistic of 26% and an F statistic of 20, and implies the second stage GMM regression does not suffer from weak instruments; J and C T tests indicate the orthogonality condition of the instruments is valid. Age grouping for immigrants from Latin America are not provided by the Census for most MSAs, so we assume they are similar to foreign-born immigrants of their same age group in their MSA. We tested this assumption for 200 MSAs where there was Latino data and could not reject this assumption.
are similar). This table presents clear evidence that MSAs with young, middle-aged or older immigrants also experience higher wages for young, middle-aged or older Black workers earning high wages, and there are fewer young, middle-aged or older poor African Americans. Table 5 considers alternative levels/differenced specifications using (3)-(5).
12 Results in (5.1)-(5.4) in Table 5 migrating from other states do not experience higher wages or wage growth; e.g., the M IG estimates average one-tenth the F B estimates and are not significant.
3.2. Causality Table 6 extends Table 5 results by more explicitly examining causality results. We use the following specifications, where ∆W i is the change in logged median wages from 2005 to 2010:
If β 1 is a significant determinant of wages and γ 3 =0 in (7) and (8), then one-way Granger causality exists. Increases in immigration lead to higher wages, and data reject the spurious correlation argument that wages lead to more immigrants. Additionally, we test (9) 
Unemployment and Employments Rates
Tables (7) and (8) assess the effects of immigration including from Latin America on Black unemployment rates. Equations (7.1)-(7.4) highlight that MSAs with higher immigration have significantly lower Black unemployment rates. This effect is economically sizeable and significant.
The OLS (GMM) equations highlight that MSAs with 6% (4.5%) more immigrants as a share of their population have a 1% lower unemployment rate with t statistics of -4.5 (-3.3). MSAs with more Latinos also experience significantly lower Black unemployment rates. Since young African Americans have high unemployment rates and young men are particularly more likely to be incarcerated, we focus on the determinants of young, Black men ages 20-24 in (7.5)-(7.8) and ages 25-34 in (7.9)-(7.12). The immigration and migration share use a similar age profile, were incarcerated, by 2000, 9.6% of Black men (and 21.2% of Black high school dropouts) were incarcerated." They blame immigration "as immigrants disproportionately increased the supply of workers in a particular skill group, the wage of Black workers in that group fell, the employment rate declined, and the incarceration rate rose." However, if this were true, the sustained increase in immigration over the last two decades should have led to declining economic conditions and increased incarceration rates among African Americans.
Incarceration Rates and Immigration
What do more recent data show? Annual data for incarceration rates and immigration go back to 1993, and Figure XV .001, respectively. For conciseness, we do not report the LAT estimates, but they have similar parameter estimates and are highly significant. Lastly, equations (10.13)-(10.24) additionally control for native-born migration flows and has a sample of 487. The F B and LAT estimates are robust to this specification, and show that MSAs with more immigration experience lower rates of Black incarceration, regardless of domestic migration. Additionally, throughout the American cohorts move closely. In this case, a common contemporaneous unobserved shock can simultaneously affect all cohorts. This can lead to spurious inference as the observations are not independent, but correlated and imply the t statistics will be biased upwards. 
Conclusion
This paper provides extensive evidence that African Americans in MSAs with more immigration experience significantly higher wages, lower unemployment and higher job creation; it is the first study in more than two decades to show that Latino immigration increases Black wages and employment, and lowers unemployment, particularly among youth. The effect is typically very significant with t statistics often exceeding four or five, and robust across different age groups and income levels. Increases in foreign born share and inflows including Latinos to an MSA is associated with less Blacks in poverty and more with higher income; this positive impact is robust across young, middle-aged and older Black workers. The rise in immigration moreover has not led to sustained rises in the Black incarceration rates. Cities with more foreign-born or changes in foreign-born including Latinos have lower Black incarceration rates.
We show that endogeneity is not a significant problem plaguing the results. If booming cities attract immigrants or if immigrants lead to negative net migration, controlling for nativeborn migration from other states or the same state should be important. However, native-born shares and flows are nearly orthogonal to foreign-born shares or flows, and do not affect the regression's parameter estimates. Increases in foreign-born workers, not increases in native-born workers from other states, lead to significantly higher African American wages and wage growth and lower unemployment. Causality tests moreover reveal that cities with more immigrants including Latinos Granger Cause higher wages and lower unemployment; whereas, cities with high Black wages or low unemployment do not lead to more foreign-born including Latinos.
Thus, the results significantly reject the hypothesis that booming cities cause immigration or immigration inflows, since results significantly support one-way causation from immigration to improved Black labor market opportunities. The paper provides strong evidence in support of the cross sectional metro approach of Card, Peri and others. (1.14)
(1. 
